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Medical Malpractice
By R. DAVID CLARK*
In a 1971 stratified national sample of American physi-
cians, "malpractice suits" were identified as the third "most
pressing problem" confronting health care in the United
States.' This concern is exemplified in the following comment:
As a physician, I live in an aura of fear-fear of suit. Fear
contributes to hostility and rarely contributes to constructive
action. Medicine has some bad doctors and some bad health
care institutions. We are not proud of them, and we are con-
cerned with the correction or elimination of that element
. * **The house of medicine, however, feels belabored. Med-
ical organizations are trying their best to overcome their defi-
ciencies, but in my opinion medical malpractice litigation is
not the best incentive to improvement. It places medicine in
an adversary position from which hostilities too often result.'
While substantial dissention exists as to the necessity of
malpractice litigation, the volume of such cases nationally has
increased each year.4 For example, the number of cases opened
nationally in 1970 was 10.6 percent greater than the number
closed that year.'
Accompanying the increased volume of claims was a simi-
lar increase in the liability premiums of health care providers.6
In 1974 the physicians in at least seven states encountered the
* Partner in the Lexington office of the firm of Boehl, Stopher, Graves & Dein-
doerfer, Louisville, Kentucky. B.A. 1967, Western Kentucky University; M.S. 1968,
Florida State University; J.D. 1972, University of Kentucky.
I S. STmICi.AND, U.S. HEALTH CARE: WHAT'S WRONG AND WHAT'S RIGHT 41 (1972).
U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S
COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE at 105-06 (1973) (statement of George Northrup,
D. 0.) [hereinafter cited as HEW REPORT].
See SUBCOMMITTEE ON ExEcUTIvE REORGANIZATION OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, STUDY ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: PATIENT VERSUS THE
PHYSICIAN, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
HEW REPORT at 7-8.
Id. at 7. In the United States, claims asserted against hospitals grew in the
period 1967 to 1970 by more than 75 percent, increasing from 1.026 to 1.862 claims per
hospital per year. HEW REPORT, app. at 610.
1 HEW REPORT at 13. Premiums rose nationally for dentists by 115 percent be-
tween 1960 and 1970; for hospitals, 262.7 percent; for physicians other than surgeons,
540.8 percent; and for surgeons during the period, 949.2 percent.
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prospect of being unable to renew insurance coverage upon its
expiration.7 That year the cost and availability of malpractice
liability coverage in Kentucky reached a situation of crisis pro-
portion.' A committee was appointed by the Governor of Ken-
tucky in 1975 to recommend legislative solutions to the critical
condition of the insurance market for health care providers.' In
March of 1976, portions of the legislative recommendations of
the majority report of that committee were enacted by the
General Assembly as the Medical Malpractice Insurance and
Claims Act'0 and the Joint Underwriting Association Act."
In addition to the legislative enactments, the Supreme
Court of Kentucky has recently decided several cases involving
health care providers. Included within the decisions of the past
survey period were issues pertaining to informed consent,1 2 the
liability of a supplier of blood for serum heptatitis,' 3 and a
surgeon's liability for failure to remove a sponge during sur-
gery," as well as other areas.' 5
I. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE AND CLAIMS ACT
The Kentucky Medical Malpractice Insurance and Claims
Wall Street Journal, Dec. 30, 1974, at 10, col. 4 (statement of H.E.W. Secretary
Casper W. Weinberger).
Brief for Defendant at 2-3, Hall v. McGuffey and Floyd v. McGuffey, Civil Nos.
86997 and 87037 (consolidated cases) (Ky. Franklin Circuit Court, Sept. 27, 1976)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Defendant]. In 1974 a premium rate increase of 282
percent was proposed to the Commissioner of Insurance of Kentucky for hospital
liability insurance. When only a 150 percent increase was approved, a major hospital
insurance carrier withdrew from the state. In 1975 the remaining carriers doing busi-
ness in Kentucky sought an additional 200 percent increase.
, Id. at 4.
,o Id. at 4-5; Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 304.40-250 to -330 [hereinafter cited as KRS];
GOVERNOR's HOSPITAL AND PHYSICIANS PROFESSIONAL LIABI TY INSURANCE ADVISORY COM-
MrI'rEE, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR, § I [hereinafter cited as GOVERNOR's REPORT]. Not
included in the Kentucky Medical Malpractice Insurance and Claims Act [hereinafter
cited as the Act] but recommended by the majority of the Committee were the
following provisions: a section eliminating punitive damage claims in malpractice
actions; a section revising the statute of limitations for assertion of a malpractice
claim; a limitation on attorney contingency fees; and a provision shifting the res ipsa
loquitur evidentiary presumption.
1 KRS §§ 304.30-010 to 304.40-140.
,2 Holton v. Pfingst, 534 S.W.2d 786 (Ky. 1975).
,3 McMichael v. American Red Cross, 532 S.W.2d 7 (Ky. 1975).
" Laws v. Harter, 534 S.W.2d 449 (Ky. 1975).
,5 Southeastern Kentucky Baptist Hospital, Inc. v. Bruce, No. 75-469 (Ky. June
11, 1976) (per curiam).
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Act [hereinafter cited as the Act] was promulgated to alle-
viate an emergency relating to "the availability and cost of
health care malpractice liability insurance.""8 The express pur-
poses of the Act are to adopt reforms in medical malpractice
claims, establish a patients' compensation fund to increase the
availability and lower the cost of medical liability insurance,
and assure that medical malpractice judgments and settle-
ments are satisfied.17 However, the expressed basis and pur-
poses do not reveal the diverse areas encompassed by the Act.
It not only provides for a patient's compensation fund,"8 but
also includes procedural and substantive standards for medical
malpractice litiga.tioh as well as a procedure to determine the
fitness for practice of any health care provider against whom a
settlement or judgment has been obtained."
A. Patients' Compensation Fund
The Patients' Compensation Fund" [hereinafter cited as
the Fund] is an agency established within the Department of
Insurance. It is expressly charged to promulgate regulations
necessary to implement and manage the Fund,2" and every
physician licensed and practicing in the state and every hospi-
tal located within Kentucky is required to become a member
of the Fund unless exempted by the Commissioner of Insur-
ance.2 However, an exemption to participation in the Fund
does not eliminate or reduce any legal liability incurred by the
health care provider.23 An exemption may be granted to a phy-
" Ky. Acts ch. 163 preamble and § 1(I)(1976).
, Id. at § 1(I). An argument can be advanced that the third legislative intent, to
assure satisfaction of malpractice claims, is merely an incidental benefit of the Act.
In the absence of a showing that the medical community has failed to satisfy merited
claims, why should the legislature adopt procedures that guarantee payment of unlim-
ited sums? Why should the victim of medical malpractice be categorized separately
from victims of other tortfeasors? An explanation may be contained in the previously
cited trial brief of the Commissioner of Insurance. In 1974 and 1975 the availability of
liability coverage was diminishing. "While most companies did continue to carry the
physicians and hospitals they had previously insured, these companies were not willing
to write new malpractice insurance. . . ." Brief for Defendant at 3-4.
Is KRS § 304.30-330.
' KRS §§ 304.40-270 to -320.
KRS § 304.40-330(1).
21 Id.
- KRS § 304.40-330(2).
2' CABINET FOR PUBLIC PROTECTION AND REGULATION, DEPARTmENT OF INSURANCE OF
1976]
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sician licensed in Kentucky only where the physician is not
practicing within the state,24 his practice is confined to per-
forming duties on behalf of agencies of the federal govern-
ment,2 his practice is confined to the status of "full-time em-
ployee" of the state,'2 or his practice is so limited or is con-
ducted under such special circumstances that he should not
reasonably be required to participate in the Fund.27 Hospitals
owned and operated by the United States are exempted from
participation as well as hospitals owned and operated in the
state "on other than a fee for service basis ... if the liability
for injury to patients injured in such hospitals is determined
solely by the State Board of Claims provided for in KRS §
44.070."21
Each member of the Fund is required to obtain liability
insurance of at least $100,000 per occurrence and $300,000 in
the aggregate for all claims occurring during any policy year."0
In addition, each member must pay an annual assessment to
be determined by the Commissioner of Insurance within limits
prescribed by the Act.3" The assessment is collected by the
insurance carrier of each member and is paid over to the Fund
within 30 days of collection. 2
The Fund may expend the monies collected by assessment
for payment of an approved malpractice settlement or judg-
ment against the health care provider which is in excess of the
coverage required by the Act.1 The manner of payment is out-
lined in the Act. 4 In the event a claimant obtains an approved
settlement or judgment in excess of the primary coverage of
KENTUCKY, REGULATION § 2(1) (June 30, 1976) [hereinafter cited as REGULATION].
24 Id. § 2(l)(a).
" Id. § 2(1)(b).





31 KRS § 304.40-330(5).
" KRS § 304.40-330(5)(b).
KRS § 304.40-330(7)(a)-(b). Malpractice is defined by the Act as any tort or
breach of contract based on health care or professional services rendered, or which
should be rendered, by a health care provider to a patient. Id. § 260(6). A tort is any
legal wrong, breach of duty, or negligent or unlawful act or omission proximately
causing injury. KRS § 304.40-260(5).
34 KRS § 304.40-330(8).
[Vol. 65
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$100,000, a claim must be filed against the Fund for payment
of the excess.35
The regulations of the Fund prescribe the manner of appli-
cation for approval of a settlement. When a negotiated settle-
ment is achieved or a final judgment is obtained and payment
of the settlement or satisfaction of the judgment is dependent
upon a payment by the Fund, a joint petition for approval of
payment is to be submitted by the insurer and the claimant.3
The regulations specify the information to be included in the
petition as well as a procedure for reporting settlements and
judgments not involving payment by the Fund.3 1
- KRS § 304.40-330(8)(b)-(c).
21 REGULATION §§ 6(3),(4) and (5).
(b) A claimant who has recovered a final judgment or an approved settle-
ment against a health care provider who is covered by the fund shall file a
claim with the fund to recover that portion of such judgment or settlement
which is in excess of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000). In the event
the fund incurs liability exceeding one million dollars ($1,000,000) to any
person under a single occurrence, the fund shall pay not more than one
million dollars ($1,000,000) per year until the claim has been paid in full.
(c) Claims filed against the fund shall be paid in the order received within
ninety (90) days after filing, unless appealed by the fund. If the fund does
not have sufficient money to pay all of the claims, claims received after the
funds are exhausted shall be paid out of the general fund of the
Commonwealth upon certification of the obligation by the commissioner of
insurance to the commissioner of the executive department for finance and
administration. Any such funds drawn from the general fund shall be repaid
with interest at the legal rate by the Kentucky patient's compensation fund
at the earliest practical time as determined by the commissioner of insur-
ance.
The regulation specifically provides in part:
(3) When the insurer of any member or any self insured member has
negotiated what it believes to be a reasonable settlement of the claim or is
required to satisfy any final judgment thereon, the insurer or self insured
shall, if the payment of such settlement or satisfaction is dependent upon
any payment by the Fund, jointly with the Claimant petition the Commis-
sioner for approval of such settlement. Such petition shall briefly state the
alleged facts on which the claim for malpractice is based, the name and
address of the injured party, the nature and extent of injury sustained, the
type and amount of damages alleged and the amount and terms of the
proposed compromised or negotiated settlement. The Commissioner shall
approve such settlement and order the payment of the Fund's proportionate
share only if he is satisfied that the settlement is fair and reasonable under
all the circumstances and in the best interest of both the Claimant and the
member, or is in satisfaction of a final judgment obtained by the Claimant
against the member.
(4) In the event a settlement shall be proposed by an insurer and a
1976]
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In evaluating the amount of funding required, several fac-
tors were considered. The Act is applicable only to malpractice
occurring after July 1, 1976.38 A survey of the rating experience
of principal malpractice insurance carriers doing business in
Kentucky indicated that had the Fund been in existence dur-
ing the last 3 years, the total claims against it would have
averaged $580,000 per year.39 Because it is anticipated that
several years will transpire before any claim could be brought
affecting the Fund, $3 to $4 million should accumulate in the
Fund through assessment before any volume of claims require
payment." It is also anticipated that any inadequacy of fund-
ing will be corrected by the legislature.4'
In addition to this umbrella coverage provided by the
Fund for claims in excess of the primary coverage required by
the Act, the Commissioner is permitted to supply primary lia-
bility coverage to any health care provider within the Fund who
is unable to acquire the coverage required by the Act "at a
premium of no greater than three hundred percent of the aver-
Claimant, and the Commissioner shall approve such settlement, then if such
settlement is rejected by the member of the Fund, the Fund shall be indem-
nified by the member for the amount of-any judgment in excess of the Fund's
liability for the rejected settlement and the costs of defense incurred after
rejection of the settlement offer.
(5) Every insurer on behalf of its insured members, or self insured
member on its own behalf, shall report to the Commissioner within 60 days
of the date on which it makes a final settlement or a final judgment is entered
against it on any claim in an amount less than that requiring approval by
the Commissioner or payment by the Fund, which report shall contain the
information required in a petition for settlement approval, as set forth in
sub-section (3) of this section, except that the Claimant need not join
therein.
3 Id. § 11.
GovERNOR's REPORT § I at 7-8.
" Id. at 8.
" Even assuming that the amount of malpractice awards subsequent to July 1,
1976, would double, or even triple, there would be adequate reserves in the Patient's
Compensation Fund [hereinafter cited as the Fund] for the payment of the awards.
In the unlikely event that a series of enormous awards would occur that would exceed
reserves set up in the Fund, the Act provides for backup funding from general state
revenues in the form of loans, to be repaid to the General Fund with interest ....
Because of the difficulty of prognosticating the long-range future of malpractice
awards, the proposed Act grants to the Commissioner of Insurance discretion in the
assessments up to the limits specified. It is reasonable to project that in the first 2 years
of activity methods of funding must be obtained, that situation can be resolved by the
legislature at its 1978 or 1980 session. Id. at 8-9.
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age premium then charged for risks of the same class and expe-
rience .... "4 However, the ability of the Fund to perform as
a primary coverage carrier is curtailed by several limitations
contained in the Act, among which is a provision that "[t]he
number of health care providers which the Commissioner may
accommodate under this section shall not exceed ten (10) in
any one (1) year."43
As noted above, the Governor of Kentucky appointed a
committee in 1975 to recommend legislative solutions to the
malpractice insurance crisis. That committee offered both a
majority and minority report regarding the Act with sharply
differing conclusions regarding the Fund.4 The majority of-
fered this opinion:
The result of the establishment of the Patients' Compensa-
tion Fund will primarily be the removal of the need for physi-
cians and hospitals to carry very expensive umbrella cover-
age, and will also reduce the amount of their basic coverage
to $100,000/$300,000. This should provide a climate wherein
private malpractice insurance carriers will be more willing to
participate in the Kentucky market. In regard to physicians
teaching and practicing at the University of Kentucky Medi-
cal Center and in other publicly-owned institutions, there
will be a substantial saving in tax dollars currently expended
or reserved for malpractice insurance with the existing high
limits of coverage. 5
," KRS § 304.40-330(6).
3 Id. The complete section provides:
If the commissioner determines that a health care provider is unable to
acquire the professional liability insurance required by subsection (3) of this
section at a premium no greater than three hundred percent (300%) of the
average premium then charged for risks of the same class and experience, or
at all, and such health care provider is unable or unwilling to qualify as a
self-insurer, then the commissioner may provide to such health care provider
coverage within the fund for the first one hundred thousand dollars
($100,000) per occurrence and three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000) in
the aggregate for all claims occurring in any one (1) policy year, and the
commissioner may designate an insurance carrier to act as the servicing
carrier for such health care provider and charge as a premium therefor an
amount to be determined by the commissioner which shall not exceed three
hundred percent (300%) of the average premium then charged for risks of the
same class and experience. The number of health care providers which the
commissioner may accommodate under this section shall not exceed ten (10)
in any one (1) year.
" GovERNOR's REPORT § II, at 9-10, and § V, at 5-6.
" Id. § II, at 9-10.
1976]
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The minority report criticizes the "unrealistically" low
limitation of personal liability of those participating in the
Fund.46 They argue that the purpose of the Fund should be to
provide protection for "the usually high judgment as opposed
to any six-figure judgment. ' 47 The minority is also critical of
the manner in which the Fund is financed:
The Fund as proposed by the Majority Report requires as-
sessments against the participants in advance of the Fund
ever being called upon to make a payment. We think that an
alternate, better method for dealing with the same problem
is to require no advance assessments of participants, but pro-
vide that when and if funds are ever needed, assessments
should then be made at the time when funds are needed to
meet a judgment. Why should physicians be fixed with pay-
ments to provide for a Fund which may never been needed?
The cost would surely just be passed on to the patient. 8
In spite of these criticisms, the majority position was subse-
quently adopted.
B. Ad Damnum Clause
The Act provides that in an action for malpractice the ad
damnum clause or prayer for damages shall not state any sum
as alleged damages other than an allegation that the damages
are in excess of the requisite minimum to establish jurisdic-
tion.49 However, the trier of fact may be advised by the parties
"as to what amounts are fair and reasonable as shown by the
evidence.""0 This innocuous section is designed to eliminate
from the malpractice complaint a demand "far in excess of
those which are shown in the evidence" since an excessive de-
mand is "unfair to the health care provider named therein as
a defendant because [he is cast] in an unfavorable light before
the general public."5 However, an indirect and unstated pur-
pose of the section appears to be an attempt to reduce the size
of jury awards indirectly.
' Id. § V, at 5.
4' Id. at 6.
48 Id.
4 KRS § 304.40-270.
oId.
1, GovERNOR's REPORT § II, at 2.
[Vol. 65
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Other jurisdictions have attempted an alternative solution
to reach the same result by substantively limiting the amount
of recovery. When the Idaho state legislature attempted this,
the statute was declared to be an unconstitutional limitation.
52
The Kentucky approach is intended as an indirect avenue for
reducing the severity of malpractice awards and the concomi-
tant rise on malpractice insurance premiums. Indeed, it is the
only constitutionally permissible way to accomplish this objec-
tive in Kentucky.
53
The specific dollar amount in an ad damnum clause in a
complaint serves no significant legal function other than as-
serting jurisdictional amount, and its elimination removes a
needless irritant to the medical profession. Even if its abolition
proves to have no effect on the size of jury awards, its elimina-
tion will not be disadvantageous to anyone.
C. Statute of Frauds
Prior to the adoption of the Act, an oral express warranty
of cure by the health care provider could be effective to bind
the provider to the warranty. However, its enforcement would
depend upon the facts of the individual case. 4 In contrast, the
Act directs that no liability for malpractice may be imposed on
the basis of an alleged breach of guarantee, warranty, or con-
tract or assurance of results of treatment unless it is in writing
and signed by the provider.5
This section is designed to eliminate the "growing tend-
ency of plaintiffs to claim an oral guaranty, warranty, contract
or assurance of results."5 Its effect is to remove an avenue of
potential malpractice recovery. In an imperceptible degree this
does perhaps correspond with the legislative goal of reducing
the rate of growth of malpractice premiums. However, the min-
imal benefit of this section does not appear to justify its enact-
ment in light of the possible abuses.
'2 IDAHO CODE § 39-4204 (1975) established a $500,000 ceiling limitation which was
held unconstitutional in Jones v. State Board of Health, Civil No. 55527 (D. Idaho,
September, 1975).
13 See Ky. CONST. § 54.
', Hackworth v. Hart, 476 S.W.2d 377, 381 (Ky. 1971)..
KRS § 304.40-300.
' GovERNoR's REPORT § I1, at 4.
1976]
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D. Reporting of Claims
Before the promulgation of the Act, no procedures existed
for collecting information concerning malpractice claims or for
notifying licensing agencies of such claims. "7 The Act requires
that all malpractice claims against a health care provider set-
tled or adjudicated to final judgment must be reported to the
Commissioner of Insurance by the affected carrier. "8 The report
must be made within 60 days of final disposition of the claim
and must recite the name and address of the involved provider,
the name and address of the claimant, the nature of the claim,
the items of alleged damage, and the amount of the settlement
or judgment.- One purpose of this section is to make specific
information available to the Commissioner to permit him "to
have ready access to all pertinent information which will have
a bearing on insurance premiums and other matters regarding
malpractice carriers.""0
The Commissioner of Insurance is directed by the Act to
forward the name of every provider against whom a settlement
or judgment is made to the "appropriate licensure board or
regulatory agency for review of the fitness of the health care
provider to practice his profession."" While the Act requires
submission of the provider's name, the regulations of the
agency direct that a monthly report is to be provided to the
proper licensing authority containing a "summary of the infor-
mation" obtained by the Commissioner.62 The Act does not
contain any directives to any medical licensure authority re-
quiring a review of the submitted information, and as a result,
the accomplishment of this stated purpose may be in doubt.
E. Informed Consent
In 1975, the Kentucky Supreme Court addressed the issue
of informed consent for the first time in the case of Holton v.
Pfingst.3 Holton alleged a failure by the appellee, Pfingst, an
57 Id.
" KRS § 304.40-310(1).
59 Id.
60 GOVERNOR's REPORT § 11, at 5.
KRS § 304.40-310(2).
"REGULATION § 6(6).
13 534 S.W.2d 786 (Ky. 1975).
[Vol. 65
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ophthalmologist, to disclose the risks of a proposed surgical
procedure properly. 4 The trial court directed a verdict in favor
of the physician, and on appeal the plaintiff argued:
• . . [S]he consented to such procedure without being fully
informed of the nature and possible consequences when in
fact she would not have done so had she been fully informed.
... [T]he evidence is clear and unmistakable that had ap-
pellant been informed of a possible grave hazard or a possible
result which would cause loss of vision or damage to the eye,
she would not have had the operation performed. .... 1
The appellant in effect argued a "material risk" approach
to the issue of informed consent, the essence of which is that
the adequacy of the physician's disclosures to the patient
should be measured by the patient's need for information ma-
terial to the risks involved.6 Thus the issue under the material
risk doctrine is framed as whether the physician's disclosures
to the patient regarding a proposed procedure were sufficient
and material to the informative needs of the patient, acting as
a reasonable person, in deciding whether to grant or withhold
consent to the procedure.
In contrast, the defendant physician urged a "medical
standard" approach upon the Court, relying in part on Wilson
v. Scott,67 wherein the court stated:
We conclude therefore that the plaintiff had the burden to
prove by expert medical evidence what a reasonable medical
practitioner of the same school and same or similar com-
munity under the same or similar circumstances would have
disclosed to his patient about the risks incident to a proposed
diagnosis or treatment, that the physician departed from that
standard, causation, and damages. The action is one of mal-
practice for a physician's failure to conform to medical stan-
dards in obtaining the patient's consent. Regardless of what
Id.
" Brief for Appellant Holton at 13, 15-16, Holton v. Pfingst, 534 S.W.2d 786 (Ky.
1975).
9' See Canterbury v. Spence, 46 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
91 412 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1967).
1976]
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some earlier informed consent cases suggest, such an action
need not be pleaded as one for assault and battery.6 8
The Court found it unnecessary to adopt either the mate-
rial risk or medical standard approach completely in deciding
Holton v. Pfingst.9 Apparently aware of the impending
codification of an informed consent standard, the Court skirted
the determination by simply commenting:
In the instant case, we are persuaded that it is unnecessary
to determine whether expert evidence should be required in
all instances where the claim is lack of informed consent
... . In the present case, it is undisputed that the physi-
cian's examination and diagnostic procedures were in accord-
ance with acceptable medical practice at the time he made
them.... There is no evidence, lay or expert, that he failed
to disclose that which he knew or should have known. His
conduct was such that giving the plaintiff's evidence all fa-
vorable inferences to her that could be drawn from it, he was
guilty, if anything, of only an honest mistake in judgment."
Despite the Court's disinclination to declare the
appropriate standard in dealing with informed consent, the
Legislature proved more willing to make an attempt.7 How-
ever, the standard provided in the Act did very little to clarify
the issue. Under the Act, in a malpractice action wherein the
claimant's informed consent is an issue, informed consent is
deemed to have been given if the health care provider obtained
the consent in acccordance with accepted medical standards
among members of the profession of similar background, and
a reasonable individual would understand from the provider's
disclosures, the procedure, acceptable alternatives, and the
substantial risks inherent in the proposed treatment or proce-
dure.72 The Act also provides that in an emergency, where con-
sent of the patient cannot be obtained, there is no requirement
that prior consent be secured.73
" Id. at 302; Brief for Appellee Pfingst at 14, Holton v. Pfingst, 534 S.W.2d 786
(Ky. 1975).
6, 534 S.W.2d 786 (Ky. 1975).
70 Id. at 789.





The result is that the Act embodies a combination of the
material risk and the medical standard approach to informed
consent. Where the facts are in dispute at least two questions
must be posed to the jury: Does the disclosure of the defendant-
health care provider conform to accepted medical standards
among providers of similar background, and would a reasona-
ble man understand from the disclosures the proposed proce-
dure, its substantial risks, and acceptable alternatives?
In addition to being a hybrid approach, the informed con-
sent provision of the Act is conceptually inconsistent with the
express purposes of its drafters. The majority report of the
Governor's Hospital and Physicians Professional Liability In-
surance Advisory Committee, which substantially drafted the
Act, indicates that the informed consent provision is designed
to require that informed consent be proven by expert testimony
as to standards of the profession, and that an objective stan-
dard be applied in determining whether additional information
would have resulted in a different decision by the plaintiff.74
The report concludes that the provisions will prevent jury spec-
ulation regarding whether the patient should have been ad-
vised of a given risk even though accepted professional stan-
dards would not require it and that the provision will prevent
the plaintiff from submitting testimony that he would have
declined the surgery had he had additional information.75 Since
the provision embodies both the material risk and medical
standard approach, it places greater evidentiary burdens upon
the defendant physician than those physicians would experi-
ence had the legislature enacted either the material risk or the
medical standard approach. While the committee submitted
the provision as a limitation on jury speculation, the section
actually invites jury determination of the understanding of the
material risks by a reasonable man. Rather than serving as an
indirect limitation upon physician liability and malpractice
premium increases, the provision creates additional eviden-
tiary burdens and jury issues. In addition, the provision con-
tains language requiring appellate decision; for example,
whether "substantial risk" is intended as a measure of the




probability of the risk or the severity of the risk, and whether
the definition is influenced by the predictability or preventa-
bility of the risk. The informed consent provision of the Act will
no doubt provide a source of future appellate controversy. 6
F. Constitutionality of the Act
In the consolidated actions of Hall v. McGuffey and Floyd
v. McGuffey, 71 a declaratory judgment was sought regarding
the constitutionality of several provisions of the Act.7 The Act
was assailed as being violative of no less than twenty sections
of the Kentucky Constitution and several provisions of the
United States Constitution.
While it is beyond the purview of this paper to review each
constitutional challenge, the provisions of the Act called into
question by the trial court merit review.8" The court ruled in
part:
We have no constitutional trepidation concerning the major-
ity of the provisions of the Act.
... There is no doubt the practice of medicine and the
operation of hospitals [which] affect the health and welfare
of the public, are subject to regulation and within the polic
power of the sovereign. However, that power should not ex-
tend beyond the public's interest in promoting health, safety,
welfare or morals. The requirement of maintenance of insur-
ance upon penalty of loss of license extends beyond the pale
of accepted regulations. Absent a showing that physicians or
hospitals are financially irresponsible or unwilling to satisfy
claims made against them such a requirement is unreason-
able and violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
.. . Whether the practice of medicine be classified a
property right or a privilege it may not be unreasonably inter-
76 See Comment, Informed Consent in Kentucky, infra p. 524.
n Consolidated Civil Action Nos. 86997 & 87037 (Franklin Circuit Court, Ken-
tucky, September 27, 1976).
7 Id. at 1 of Judgment.
Id. at 3 of Opinion.
At the date of this writing no appeal of the Franklin Circuit Court decision has
been filed; nevertheless such an appeal is certain.
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fered with unless it is done to protect the public interest. The
practice of medicine is a lawful, honorable and necessary
profession. It is presently subject to state regulation. To im-
pose upon this class the responsibility for curing the ills rec-
ognized in the preamble to the Act, without an attendant
finding of responsibility for such ills is unreasonable. The
individual's right to earn a livelihood and the public's right
to be administered [to] is being stripped away. Such depri-
vation is a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Section 13 of the Kentucky
Constitution and there is a denial of due process and contra
to both Sections 2 and 3 of the Kentucky Constitution.
The other constitutional infirmity lies in Section
10(8)(c). Referring to the Kentucky patients compensation
fund that section provides ". . . claims received after the
funds are exhausted shall be paid out of the general fund of
the Commonwealth. . . . Any such funds drawn from the
general fund shall be repaid. . . ." This section of the Act in
fact and in spirit transgresses several sections of the Constitu-
tion.
. . . By obligating the general fund of the Common-
wealth, a debt of the state is created. Future revenues are
committed. The payment of a compensation fund claim from
the general fund is payment of a private claim, a special
privilege. No less than six sections of the Kentucky Constitu-
tion are violated by this section of the Act, Kentucky Consti-
tution Sections 49, 50, 58, 3, 171, 177 and perhaps others."
Defenders of the Act contend that the requirement of mal-
practice liability coverage and participation in the fund is a
valid exercise of the police power of the sovereignty 2 similar to
the requirement that automobile owners carry liability insur-
ance. It falls within the province of the legislature to assimi-
late and consider all factors inherent to the concept of public
welfare. If the issues involve the public welfare, then the ad-
justments are solely within the province of the legislature
I, Id. at 3-6 of Opinion.
12 Id. at 8 of Brief for Defendant McGuffey; see Roe v. Commonwealth of Ken-
tucky, 405 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. 1966), Workmen's Compensation Board v. Abbott, 278 S.W.
533 (Ky. 1925), State Racing Commission v. Latonia Agricultural Ass'n, 123 S.W. 681
(Ky. 1909).
91 Id. at 10 of Brief for Defendant McGuffey; see KRS § 304.39-110.
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through the police power.84 Proponents of the Act also assert
that any transfer of monies from the general fund of the Com-
monwealth to the Patients' Compensation Fund is constitu-
tional. As argued, it does not create an indebtedness in viola-
tion of the Kentucky Constitution but should be viewed as a
constitutional appropriation to a state agency to be refunded
by that agency pursuant to the Act.
8
1
The constitutional issues framed by the Act and its oppo-
nents must necessarily be answered by the appellate courts and
possibly by remedial legislation. Since the Fund does not antic-
ipate payment of substantial numbers of claims for 2 to 3 years,
the urgency is not as great as has been argued. Notwithstand-
ing, nonresolution of the funding questions both as to manda-
tory participation and use of the general fund of the state could
be catastrophic since the funding projections of the Depart-
ment of Insurance have been founded upon an assumption of
mandatory participation of all health care providers.
II. JOINT UNDERWRITING AsSOCIATION
Accompanying the passage of the Medical Malpractice
Insurance and Claims Act was An Act to Establish a Medical
Malpractice Liability Joint Underwriting Association 86 [here-
inafter cited as Underwriting Act]. The purpose of the Under-
writing Act is to authorize the Commissioner of Insurance to
compel prescribed Kentucky insurers to become members of
a joint underwriting association, and require that the associa-
tion provide primary malpractice insurance coverage when it
has been determined that the coverage is not available in the
voluntary market." As a condition precedent to transacting
business in the state, every workmen's compensation, general
liability, automobile liability, commercial multi-peril, and
' Id. at 10 of Brief for Defendant McGuffey.
Id. at 21 of Brief for Defendant McGuffey. The constitutional attacks on this
provision of the Act were numerous. Based upon sections 3, 49, 50, 58, 171, and 177 of
the Kentucky Constitution, the arguments opposing the provision are well considered.
To determine that the questioned provision of the Act is constitutional would appar-
ently require more liberal interpretation of the cited sections of the Kentucky Constitu-
tion.
., KRS § 304.40 (1976).
91 KRS § 304.40-030(1), (2).
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health insurer must become a member of the association.88
Upon a determination by the Commissioner of Insurance
that medical malpractice insurance cannot be made available
in the voluntary market for physicians, hospitals, or all other
licensed health care providers, he is required to implement the
operation of the Joint Underwriting Association. 9 The
association is empowered as follows:
(a) to issue, or to cause to be issued, policies of insurance
to applicants, including incidental coverages and subject to
limitations as specified in the plan of operation, but not to
exceed one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) for each
claimant under one (1) policy and one million dollars
($1,000,000) for all claimants under one (1) policy in any one
(1) year;
(b) to underwrite such insurance and to adjust and pay
losses with respect thereto, or to appoint service companies
to perform those functions;
(c) to assume reinsurance from its members;
(d) to cede reinsurance; and
(e) to negotiate and obtain in the voluntary market medical
malpractice insurance for any health care provider to whom
the association has issued or caused to be issued a policy of
medical malpractice insurance with the foregoing limits.
After implementation of the association, the health care provi-
der is entitled to apply to the association for malpractice insur-
ance,9 ' or he may procure that coverage from the private mar-
ket.
2
While the Underwriting Act describes in detail the circum-
stances of its implementation,93 the membership of the associa-
tion,94 the duties of the association,95 the manner of rating of
coverage,96 the method of funding, 7 the management organiza-
0 KRS § 304.40-030(1).
9' KRS § 304.40-030(2).
" KRS § 304.40-040.
" KRS § 304.40-070.
2 KRS § 304.40-030(2).
'3 KRS § 304.40-030(1)-(2).
" KRS § 304.40-030(1).
"1 KRS §§ 304.40-030(3), (4), -040.
" KRS §§ 304.40-050(4),(5) and (6), -080.
"7 KRS §§ 304.40-050, -060.
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tion,98 and the duration of the association, 9 it must be antici-
pated that the Underwriting Act will experience severe consti-
tutional scrutiny. At this writing no challenge to the constitu-
tionality of the Underwriting Act is known to have been filed.
Nevertheless enactments of similar purpose elsewhere have
been declared to be unconstitutional as an arbitrary interfer-
ence with private business.' 0
Il. DECISIONS OF THE COURT
Although several cases involving issues relevant to medical
malpractice were decided by the Kentucky Supreme Court
during the past survey year, most fell within established legal
standards and were passed upon by the Court without depar-
ture from prior case law. However, two cases received signifi-
cant treatment by the Court, one involving a case of first im-
pression in this jurisdiction, and the other resulting in an im-
portant departure from prior case law.
A. McMichael v. American Red Cross
McMichael v. American Red Cross'"' is a case of first im-
pression in Kentucky involving liability of the supplier of blood
which may carry impurities and diseases resulting in injury to
the recipient. In McMichael the Kentucky Supreme Court was
confronted with the issues of whether the transfer of donor
blood for a service fee was a "sale" within the meaning of the
Uniform Commercial Code,' 2 whether the appellee was a
"seller" within the meaning of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts,03 and whether donor blood containing serum hepatitis
virus was unavoidably unsafe within the meaning of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts.' 4
McMichael had been hospitalized for severe bums, and
during that time he had received whole blood plasma from five
' KRS § 304.40-090.
" KRS § 304.40-030(2).
'® Hartford Accident & Indemn. Co. v. Ingram, 226 S.E.2d 498, 507 (N.C. 1976).
101 532 S.W.2d 7 (Ky. 1975).
KRS §§ 355.2-106, -314 and -315.
"a RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
,0, Id. § 402A (comment k).
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separate donors. The blood had been furnished to the hospital
by the American Red Cross in a sterile condition for a service
charge of $19.95 per unit. The Red Cross had utilized the "best
available manner" to screen the donors for the prevention of
possible contamination within the donor's blood. Nevertheless,
47 days later, within the normal incubation period for serum
hepatitis, McMichael was diagnosed as having contracted that
disease."15
A review of analogous foreign cases reveals that courts
rarely recognize a recovery on the theories of implied warranty
or strict liability. The rejection of these two theories of recovery
is based on the theory that the "service" aspect predominates
over the "sale" aspect in blood transfusion cases. In addition,
the cost of the blood is viewed as merely an incidental feature
of the services rendered and not indicative of a sale."'6 In sup-
port of his argument on the issues of whether the transfer of
blood was a sale and whether the Red Cross was a seller, the
appellee, American Red Cross, placed reliance upon this
weight of authority, as well as on KRS § 139.125.11 That stat-
ute provides in part that "the procurement, processing, distri-
bution, or use of whole blood.., is declared not to be a sale."
0 8
However, the Court did not consider it necessary to consider
either of these issues. The Court based its decision solely on the
remaining issue, and concluded that the blood given to McMi-
chael was unavoidably unsafe under Section 402A of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts. The Court ruled:
We do not find it necessary to discuss the applicability or
constitutionality of the statute, or the questions of whether,
without regard to the statute, the transfer of donor blood by
Red Cross to a hospital for a service fee is a sale under the
Uniform Commercial Code, KRS 355.2-314 and 355.2-315, so
as to give rise to an implied warranty, and whether Red Cross
1 McMichael v. American Red Cross, 532 S.W.2d 7 (Ky. 1975).
'0 See Whitehurst v. American Nat. Red Cross, 402 P.2d 584 (Ariz. 1965); Hoder
v. Sayet, 196 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 1967); Lovett v. Emory University, Inc., 156 S.E.2d 923
(Ga. App. 1967); Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, 123 N.E.2d 792 (N.Y. 1954);
Hoffman v. Misericordia Hospital, 267 A.2d 867 (Pa. 1970); Gile v. Kennewick Public
Hospital, 296 P.2d 662 (Wash. 1956); Koenig v. Milwaukee Blood Center, Inc., 127
N.W.2d 50 (Wis. 1964).
'' McMichael v. American Red Cross, 532 S.W.2d at 7, 8, & 9 (Ky. 1975).
" KRS § 139.125.
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is a seller under Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts 2nd
so as to be subject to strict tort liability. Our conclusion is
that even if the statute be inapplicable or unconstitutional,
and even if the transfer be deemed a sale and Red Cross a
seller, the directed verdict in the instant case was proper
because under the stipulated facts there were no methods
available at the time in question by which hepatitis virus
could effectively be excluded from blood or the presence of
the virus determined. Therefore, the blood involved in the
instant case, to the extent it may have contained hepatitis
virus, was unavoidably unsafe as discussed in Comment (K)
under Section 402A of the Restatement and for that reason
it was not unreasonably dangerous within the terms of Sec-
tion 402A and it did not fail to be fit within the terms of the
warranties provided for in the Uniform Commercial Code,
KRS 355.2-314 and 355.2-315."°'
While the Court's decision is amply supported by existing
case law, it is unfortunate that the Court decided the case upon
this narrow ground. Clearly, future litigation on the issues of
whether the furnishing of blood is a sale or service (which may
also necessitate a constitutionality decision on KRS § 139.125),
and whether the Red Cross is a seller within the meaning of the
Restatement will arise in serum hepatitis ' as well as other
contaminated or "bad" blood cases.
11'
B. Laws v. Harter
The decision of the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Laws
v. Harter"' is more than another review of the typical sponge
case. It removes any notion that liability is an issue in analo-
gous cases and discloses that the Court is willing to declare
certain actions by physicians to be negligent without regard to
evidence of acceptable medical standards.
In that case the plaintiff, Laws, underwent a surgical pro-
cedure which was performed by the defendant, Harter. During
M" McMichael v. American Red Cross, 532 S.W.2d at 9 (Ky. 1975).
110 See Boland, Strict Liability in Tort for Transferring Contaminated Blood, 23
ARK. L. Rxv. 236, 241-42 (1969), where it is asserted that a method of prediction in
serum hepatitis cases may exist.
M A detailed discussion of this as well as other problems posed by McMichael can
be found in Ausness, Kentucky Law Survey-Torts, suprap. 301.
,,2 534 S.W.2d 449 (Ky. 1975).
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the course of the surgery, and before an incision into the dia-
phragm was closed, a sponge count was completed and re-
ported as accurate.1 13 The incision in the diaphragm was then
sutured and a second count was completed prior to the closure
of the incision in the chest wall. At this point a sponge was
found to be missing."' The sponge contained an opague mate-
rial and x-rays were secured for the purpose of locating the
sponge. The sponge was not found and the patient was closed
for medical considerations."15 A sponge was thereafter located
by x-ray and surgically removed."'
At trial the physician obtained a directed verdict after
submitting evidence that all possible care had been exercised.
The patient appealed the decision" 7 and again the physician
asserted that the record of the case contained no evidence of
negligence.
This included looking in the "kick bucket"; looking on the
floor; looking on the back table; looking on the bottoms of the
operating team's shoe covers; and even looking outside the
operating room itself on the off-chance that it might have
been carried out on someone's clothing. When that failed, the
next proper and customary step was followed and that step
was the use of an x-ray machine in the operating room itself
with the patient still open. The three experts involved-the
radiologist, Dr. Harter with his many years of experience, and
Dr. Bowers with his many years of experience, were unable
to locate the sponge by that usual method. When that proper
method also failed-as had the all hands search-Dr. Harter
and Dr. Bowers took the next step which is also customary
and usual of getting yet another x-ray. Still no success! "
M Generally, at the beginning of a surgical operation the number of sponges
marked with a radiopaque filament are counted and the number is audibly declared
and recorded by the scrub nurse and circulating nurse. No sponges are removed from
the operating room during surgery and continual care is maintained to account for the
presence of each sponge. Should a sponge be cut by a surgeon he deliberately presents
the pieces to the nurse in order to keep them in one place. Before the closure of a large
wound the circulating nurse counts the used sponges and the scrub nurse counts the
unused sponges. The total must equal the number given to the scrub nurse at the
beginning of the surgery. Annot., 16 AM. JuR. Proof of Facts 155, 171-72 (1965).




"A Brief for Appellee Harter at 13-14, Laws v. Harter, 534 S.W.2d 449 (Ky. 1975).
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In its decision the Supreme Court of Kentucky conceded
that the physician may have exercised the "highest degree of
skill known to the medical profession" in his attempt to locate
the missing sponge."' Nevertheless the Court concluded that
the physician was negligent as a matter of law in failing to
properly account for the sponge. '
This represents a departure from past decisions of the
Court since prior to Laws the Court has always held the issue
of the physician's negligence to be for the jury's determination.
In Butts v. Watts ' an issue was submitted as to whether ex-
pert opinion was required to establish that a dentist was negli-
gent in failing to remove a portion of a broken tooth from a
patient. The Court commented that this was similar to leaving
a foreign object in the body of a surgical patient wherein the
Court had previously held the physician negligent per se.
122
However, a review of the Kentucky cases relied upon by the
Court for that conclusion reveals that it is erroneous. In the
first, Samuels v. Willis'1 a physician was charged with negli-
gently leaving a sponge in a surgical incision.124 In affirming a
jury verdict the Court said that it was for the jury to determine
whether the physician exercised the requisite degree of care.'1
In the second case cited by the Court, Barnett's Administrator
v. Brand,12 1 the Court not only concluded that the identical
issue was for the jury but also prescribed a jury instruction on
behalf of the physician.'2 That. instruction provided a defense
to the physician if a delay in closure of the incision would have
endangered the safety of the patient.' Thus Laws does repre-
"' 534 S.W.2d at 451 (Ky. 1975).
' Id.
121 290 S.W.2d 777 (Ky. 1956).
"2 Id. at 780.
'2 118 S.W. 339 (Ky. 1909).
12 Id. at 340.
22 Id. at 342.
2 177 S.W. 461 (Ky. 1915).
"2 Id. at 464.
Iz8 Id.
We also conclude that on another trial the court, in lieu of instruction
No. 6, should tell the jury, in substance, that if they believe from the evi-
dence that the defendant believed, and had reasonable grounds to believe,
that the condition of the decedent was such that further delay in exploring
for pads and sponges, or in closing the operation, would endanger her safety,
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sent a significant departure from prior decisions." 9
While Laws lacks general support in other jurisdictions,'30
Louisiana recently adopted a similar rule in Guilbeau v. St.
Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co.'3' A surgeon, who had
closed a surgical patient prior to removal of a laparotomy pad,
was held to be negligent per se in that case. 32 In a dissenting
opinion and a dissent to a denial of rehearing it was argued that
the surgeon properly relied upon the sponge count as accurate
which conformed to the best medical standards; that to have
disregarded the sponge count and probed for the unknown pad
would have endangered the patient by spreading disease to
healthy tissue; and that the majority decision was an adoption
of a "strict liability" approach. 3'
Under the rule of this case, even the most extraordinary de-
gree of skill and caution, even the most unusual surgical pro-
cedures performed under adverse circumstances, will not
serve to exculpate the surgeon.
... There is no precedent in our law for applying such a
strict standard of liability to a surgeon. It is wholly inappro-
priate since the essence of his work is skill and caution, not a
mechanical disassembly and reassembly of components.'34
Arguably, the above comments are applicable to Laws.
In Laws the Court ruled that on retrial the jury was to be
instructed to find for the plaintiff should it determine that
another surgical procedure was required to remove the sponge.
The Court thus removes from jury consideration all relevant
testimony regarding the nature and the circumstances of the
surgery, whether ordinary or extraordinary. The excluded testi-
mony includes evidence relating to both the proper medical
the defendant was not negligent in then leaving the pad or sponge in the
decedent's abdomen, and they cannot find for the plaintiff on that ground.
In See also Hazard Hospital Co. v. Combs Adm'r, 92 S.W.2d 35 (Ky. 1936); Jett
v. Linville, 259 S.W. 43 (Ky. 1924).
I" See Burke v. Washington Hospital Center, 475 F.2d 364 (D.D.C. 1973); Robin-
son v. St. Johns Medical Center, 508 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. App. 1974); Easter v. Hancock,
346 A.2d 323 (Pa. Super. 1975); Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 9 (1966).
"' 325 So. 2d 395 (La. 1975).
132 Id. at 398.
,3 Id. at 398-400.
'3' Id. at 400.
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standards and the necessity of closure of an incision for medical
considerations.
The Court has previously established evidentiary excep-
tions to the rule that expert medical testimony is required to
establish a breach of care by a physician.' 35 A physician owes
his patient that degree of care and skill which is expected of a
reasonably competent practitioner in the same speciality, act-
ing in similar circumstances' 36 and expert opinion is required
to establish a breach of this duty if the negligence is not so
apparent that laymen with general knowledge would recognize
it. '3 In determining that Harter was negligent as a matter of
law the Court moved beyond the evidentiary exception to disre-
gard expert medical testimony relevant to the issue of breach
of care. Certainly it cannot be argued that the court should not
retain the power to determine that the usual practices of the
medical profession, or any profession, fail to meet the standard
of reasonable care-to hold the defendant liable notwithstand-
ing the fact that his actions were in accord with standard prac-
tice. To prohibit the court from this would diminish the deter-
rent effect of negligence law and result in extreme unfairness
in particular cases. However, it would be overstepping that
power for the Court to declare certain acts negligent as a matter
of law where the usual practices of that profession are not un-
reasonable in themselves in light of circumstances peculiar to
the specific practice.
At this time the impact of Laws v. Harter upon decisions
by the Kentucky trial courts and Kentucky physicians is of
primary concern. If Laws is interpreted by the trial court as
limiting issues and evidence to the question of damages, then
indeed the physician will be subjected to "strict liability" in
foreign object cases without regard to the medical situation or
standard practice. The potential inequities to the physician are
apparent. More important, however, is the potential impact of
Laws upon medical decision-making. As described in
Guilbeau, there is danger that the search for foreign objects will
be evaluated above the higher priority of the patient's health.
It is suggested that the Court reexamine its position in Laws
in view of its potential effects.
1' Johnson v. Vaughn, 370 S.W.2d 591, 596 (Ky. 1963).
1' Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 591, 596 (Ky. 1963).
I" Id.
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